The origin and impact of inflation by Darryl R. Francis
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II T IS A pleasure to be here in Toronto and to share
with you my views on inflation. This is a subject
whose popularity has fluctuated with cyclical fluctua-
tions in business activity; it is debated during up-
swings only to recede into oblivion during down-
swings. Yet, in my opinion, it is a subject which should
be analyzed at all times since it is during downswings
that the seeds of inflation are sown.
You have suggested that I speak on the monetarist
view of inflation, While the framework within which
I analyze the causes and consequences of inflation is
of the monetarist variety, I think I should mention
that what I consider most important does not neces-
sarily represent the views of all monetarists. In order
to put things into perspective, I should like to outline
this framework of analysis.
An increase in the total money stock, when it is not
accompanied by a similar increase in output, has a
predictable effect on behavior. Individuals will at-
tempt to divest themselves of what they consider to
be their excess money balances by bidding for other,
nonmoney assets. As the prices of these assets rise,
output is stimulated. But such increases in output
are limited by the growth of resources, Expansion of
the money stock produces only a transitory increase
in production, while it leads to a permanent rise in
the rate of increase of prices. Evidence confirming
these results is not difficult to find; rates of growth of
money and rates of increase in the price level closely
parallel each other when viewed as long-term trends.
A great deal of evidence has been amassed showing
that an increase above the trend growth of money
which persists for at least two quarters will lead to a
rise in the rate of output growth which is quite short-
lived. However, as the rate of production returns to its
trend level, the rate of inflation increases. We have
observed a symmetrical situation for declines in the
rate of money growth. Such declines create transitory
recessions that are replaced by lower inflation rates in
six to eight quarters,
Despite many arguments to the contrary, it is clear
that central banks can control the money supply
within a very narrow range over a time period of a
quarter or more. But if we accept the above relation-
ship between money supply and the price level, why
has the money stock been allowed to grow in such a
way as to produce persistent and accelerating infla-
tion punctuated by occasional recessions? Have cen-
tral banks produced this growth pattern through some
nefarious design? Have they merely been incompe-
tent? I, for one, believe that neither is the case and
that we must look to our political and social aspira-
tions for the root causes of the economic dilemma
upon whose horns we sit so very uncomfortably.
In doing this, I shall confine my observations to the
American experience, simply because I am most fa-
miliar with the trials of the U.S. economy. I am quite
sure, however, that parallels can be drawn for
Canada and many other Western industrialized na-
tions which face the same problems of inflation and
unemployment.
For many years, Government spending and the size
of the Government sector have expanded at an in-
creasing rate, Since 1950 total annual Government cx-
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penditures have risen by about $454 billion, with $328
billion of that having been recorded in the past ten
years. This growth was spurred by an underlying
philosophy which contends that greater direct Govern-
ment activity is the best way, if not the only way, to
achieve certain economic and social goals. So let us
consider the claims of those who espouse this philos-
ophy and examine their validity. I-las this spending
accomplished what it set out to do? Was it indeed the
“best”way? And finally, has it had other consequences,
too important to be termed merely “side effects,”
which have imposed high costs on us all?
it i)t tiC
One of the oldest arguments in favor of increased
Governmental incursion into economic life holds that
fiscal policy is the proper, indeed the necessary, tool
to stimulate the economy and combat unemployment.
In addition to the automatic stabilizing effects of tax
and transfer payment policy, it has been alleged that
the Government should introduce significant spending
efforts when the activity of the private sector isinade-
quate for full employment, however defined. And it
is argued that this spending should engender deficits,
since financing through higher taxes would reduce
private purchasing power and frustrate the attempt
to expand total demand,
Historically, Government deficit spending has had
no stimulative effects except insofar as it was accom-
panied by monetary expansion. Thus the stimulation
desired could have been accomplished directly
through monetary expansion without the Government
encroachment into the private sector that is inherent
in expansive fiscal policy. More important, we know
that the fiscal stimulus is only transitory — that the
output effects of excessive money growth are quickly
dissipated and that the only lasting result is ever ag-
gravated inflation. Consider our actual performance.
Have we reduced fluctuations in output and employ-
ment through the wide use of fiscal deficits and sur-
pluses? Obviously the answer is no. Since the inception
of these policies in the early 1930s, the frequency and
magnitude of economic fluctuations have not differed
significantly from those prior to that period.
A second popular argument, and on the surface a
very persuasive one, states that it is the proper func-
tion of Government to employ those resources, par-
ticularly labor, which the private sector is unwilling to
employ, Presumably, the whole society benefits from
such programs at no cost, since additional production
is being provided by those who were previously con-
tributing nothing. This is a seductive argument which
merits careful examination. Surely we must agree that
private enterprise will always take advantage of the
opportunity to employ resources which it expects to
use profitably. When some resources are not so em-
ployed, it means only that their services are not worth
the price attached to them.
For the cause of this situation, we must again look
to the influence of Government. Hedged in as we have
become by laws requiring the payment of minimum
wages and “equal pay for equal work,” we have seen
more and more of the labor force become unemploy-
able, And when the Government puts them to work,
one basic result is the same. To the extent that these
people are being paid more than the market decrees,
there is a real transfer of wealth to them from the
rest of society. Real output may be greater, but much
of the increase in their welfare comes not from their
new productivity but from the rest of us.
To gauge the accomplishments of these policies,
whatever their redistributive effects, we need only to
look at what has occurred. In the face of many job-
creation programs, we find that output growth has
risen at approximately a constant trend rate since
1946, irrespective of the rate of Government spending,
And in the same period, unemployment fluctuated
around an average of 4.9 percent until its recent
increase.
An argument of more recent vintage maintains that
the goods and services provided by the private sector
in response to society’s demands do not respond to the
so-called “true needs” of society. It follows from this
that the Government should divert resources to the
satisfaction of these needs. More and more programs
have been enacted in areas ranging from health care
to ctmltural pursuits. Whether they have increased our
welfare is highly questionable. We have obtained
these services only by sacrificing other things we
would have chosen for ourselves. But in their efforts
to make it appear that there is indeed such a thing as
a free lunch, our elected officials have increased Gov-
ernment expenditures without attempting a corres-
ponding rise in taxes. As a result, monetary growth
and inflation have provided the means of transferring
control of resources from private hands into the hands
of bureaucrats who, it would seem, know our needs
better than we ourselves do.
Page 19 IFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS DECEMBER 1975
Finally, implicit in all the arguments of the advo-
cates of interference is the assumption that an ex-
panded Government role in economic activity will,
and should, redistribute income in the direction of
some notion of greater equality, Whether this redis-
tribution is indeed desirable is an argument which has
probably existed since the first two humans met. I will
not attempt to make any enlightening contributions to
that debate. It is fair to ask, however, what has been
achieved. In spite of the expanding role of Govern-
ment activity since World War II, the distribution of
income has changed very little. The income group
representing the lowest twenty percent received 5
percent of total income in 1947 and 5.5 percent in
1971, while the share of the highest 20 percent fell
from 43 percent in 1947 to 41.6 percent in 1971. This
can hardly be considered a significant accomplish-
ment, expecially in view of the costs incurred.
These proposals to improve our socio-ecouomie wel-
fare have, through design or through ignorance,
overlooked the problem of financing the additional
expenditures. The basic issue in the financing of Gov-
ernment programs is that resources have to be trans-
ferred from one sector of the economy to another. This
can be accomplished in only three ways. One is to tax
current private consumption and investment — that
is, to increase taxes, The second is to taxfuture private
consumption by incurring a deficit and selling Govern-
ment securities to the private sector. This method
moves resources immediately by reducing the pur-
chasing power of security buyers only, but ultimately
spreads the burden to all taxpayers when the securi-
ties must he redeemed. And the third is to finance the
deficit by indirectly selling securities to the central
bank which buys them with newly created money.
When deficits are financed by the sale of Govern-
ment securities, the attendant additions to the demand
for credit must exert upward pressure on interest
rates. Aside from directly discouraging private con-
sumption and investment spending, higher interest
rates, like taxes, are politically undesirable, Hence,
these first two methods have typically not been
favored. If the central bank must submit to political
pressure to contain increases in interest rates, the
solution is clear. The monetary authority is compelled
to buy at least a portion of the Governuient issues
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from the private sector. This action undoubtedly
mitigates the initial pressure on interest rates, but at
the same time it stimulates money growth and the
ensuing inflation leads eventually to higher interest
rates,
The process I have outlined here is not hypothet-
ical; we have seen it in operation over the greater part
of the past thirty years. Since 1950, the Federal Gov-
ernment’s debt has grown by $176 billion. In that
same period, the Federal Reserve System’s holdings of
debt have grown by 568 billion and the money stock
has increased by $176 billion. Meanwhile, proponents
of deficit spending as a stimulus have proudly pointed
to their successes as they saw output and employment
increase — however briefly — with each new deficit,
and considered the attendant inflation a small price to
pay for the short-run achievements,
To sum up: there is no convincing evidence that
increased Government spending, with its accompany-
ing deficits, has accomplished its stated social goals.
There is no evidence whatsoever that it is the most
efficient way to pursue these goals or even that any
benefits have exceeded the costs involved. On the
other hand, there is overwhelming evidence that it
has led to our persistent inflation. I can therefore say
tmequivocally that not only are the causes of inflation
identifiable, but they can he eliminated, That they
should be eliminated becomes clear once we consider
the consequences of inflation.
One of these results is that it can inspire monetary
policies which reinforce inflationary pressures. I have
already discussed the fact that increased Government
borrowing exerts an upward pressure on interest rates.
When the central bank is then called upon to mone-
tize a part of the debt in order to counteract that
pressure, inflation ensues, Each time this process has
been pursued, interest rates have not stayed down
for long. As people become aware of inflation and
the expanded money supply, they expect prices to
rise further. Interest rates rise as inflationary premi-
ums are incorporated into them. The central bank
again attempts to resist the rise by increasing the
money supply and the whole cycle is renewed.
A closely related policy-induced effect is the reces-
sions brought about by recurrent efforts to reduce
inflation rapidly and drastically. When the concern
for inflation becomes greater than that for interest
rates, there are periodic attempts to reduce the rate of
price rise by sharp reductions in the rate of moneyITAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS DECEMBER 1975
growth. These reductions have been responsible for
most of our recessions and increases in unemployment.
The less visible consequences of inflation are per-
haps even more ominous. An inflation which is not
fully anticipated brings about a redistribution of
wealth from creditors to debtors. When people see
this occurring, they will bend their efforts toward pro-
tecting themselves from these effects.
Another subtle aspect of inflation is the loss which
inflation imposes on all holders of money. Inflation
leads all economic units, both individual consumers
and firms, to try to maintain smaller money balances
and, as they become a more costly productive re-
source, to make greater attempts to economize on their
use. But these attempts require the use of substitute
resources, not the least of which are the time and
effort involved in devising alternatives to money trans-
actions. I think you can easily visualize where this
leads; we are all aware of the inefficiences of bilateral
barter transactions. Money is a useful good which
permits increased specialization in production and
any decrease in that specialization necessarily leads
to a reduction in output. The recorded instances of
very rapid rates of inflation in Europe and South
America convincingly illustrate this fact.
A major consequence of the inflation that we have
experienced is the increased uncertainty which has
had an impact on every aspect of our economic life.
There are really two factors at work here. First, when
a society has come to expect a fluctuating inflation
rate which cannot be accurately predicted, long-term
financial contracts become increasingly risky to both
lenders and borrowers; hence, they become increas-
ingly rare. I am sure you are all aware that since the
early 1930s the average time to maturity of debt obli-
gations has decreased substantially. Greater uncer-
tainty — that is greater risk — as to the financing of
bug-term investment leads to reluctance to undertake
such investment. As a result, productive capacity is
iusvcred and future consumption possibilities are
sicereased,
Another source of increased uncertainty, and one
whose effects become immediately apparent, is that
we have been led to expect the Government periodi-
cally to attempt to combat inflation in ways and at
times that we cannot predict. Many of these tech-
niques, such as wage and price controls and the re-
actions to therri, can, and already have, produced
serious distortions in the economic process.
An excellent example is the phenomenon observed
in the American automobile industry in the past year.
Faced with poor sales, manufacturers reacted not
with straightforward price cuts, but with elaborate
rebate programs which were more costly for both them
and their customers. The only reason which I can see
for this extraordinary maneuver is that they feared the
imminent reimposition of price controls and wished
to insure themselves the greatest possible flexibility in
the face of this threat.
It is the long-term, often slowly working, and hardly
visible effects of inflation, which, in my opinion, repre-
sent the greatest danger. They lower the standard of
living; they undermine the fiber of our political, eco-
nomic and social system; and because they are not
readily apparent, inflation frequently is considered to
be of secondary importance to more visible, but transi-
tory, economic problems.
Our current situation affords us a perfect example
of the problems I have outlined. Although it seems
that \ve have reached the bottom of the recession and
that recovery is surely underway, unemployment rates
remain relatively high and some industries still suffer
low rates of growth in demand. As recovery progresses
and inventory liquidation ceases it is reasonable to
expect that private borrowing will increase; this is
hound to exert an upward pressure on interest rates.
Now, how will the Government react to this combi-
nation of circumstances? Will it again consciously dis-
regard the dangers of inflation, addressing itself to the
short-run unemployment problem with traditionally
ill-conceived and ineffective spending programs? Such
a course of action will engender massive Government
demands on the credit market, adding to the upward
push on interest rates. To combat this, money growth
must accelerate, bringing with it greater inflation in a
year or so and still higher interest rates,
What then? Will aggravated inflation be permitted
or will we subject the economy to another recession?
Or shall we, alternatively, break from our traditional
response, allow the economy to continue the progress
it has begun, and notcreate new problems by attempts
to accelerate that progress or to depress the interest
rate. These are the alternatives which face policy-
makers.
In conclusion, let me restate myfundamental propo-
sitions. First, it is quite evident that inflation is the
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result of excessive monetary growth and that demand-
induced recessions are caused by sharp downward
deviations from this growth path. Second, monetary
growth in excess of resource growth has been the most
dependable result of Government deficits and the de-
sire to mask the resource transfers that these deficits
are assumed to entail, Third, deficits have typically
arisen from attempts to change socio-economic condi-
tions — attempts which have, just as typically, been
futile.
Solutions are readily available, but they require a
time horizon which extends beyond the next election
and beyond the short-term outlook and narrow analyt-
ical base of many economists. The basic requirement
is the realization that all social and economic programs
entail a cost which must be paid in one form or
another. If this realization becomes prevalent and if
the costs become clear, there will be no need for
central bank financing of huge Government deficits.
Neither will there be a necessity for maintaining in-
terest rates at some predetermined level. In short,
there will be no need to fool the electorate. This
would free the monetary authorities to control the
growth of the money stock, keeping it at a rate con-
sistent \vith the rate of growth of output and eliminat-
ing the major cause of both inflation and demand-
induced recession.
Meanwhile, in the current circumstances, it is per-
fectly feasible to permit interest rates to seek their
market-determined level and to start a very gradual
deceleration in the trend rate of money growth. It may
take a year or two or three, but inflation can be re-
duced without the emergence of recession. But again,
a necessary condition is the discipline imnposed by
public knowledge that any service provided by the
Government must be paid for by the public itself and
must be paid immediately.
Perhaps such knowledge will reduce demands for
Governmental services, or at least eliminate the politi-
cal pressures to pretend that these services can be
provided free of charge. And in my opinion, these pre-
tentions are the major impulses which set in motion
the causes of inflation.
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